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UNDERSTANDING LEGAL COMPLIANCE 
V. Lee Hamilton* 
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW. By Tom R. Tyler. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 1990. Pp. vii, 273. $30. 
Why do people obey the law? In his new book, Tom Tyler argues 
against one popular answer to this question: the view that compliance 
follows from, and must be justified in terms of, self-interest. This in-
strumental view of compliance - that people obey the law because it 
is in their interest to do so - is found in law and across the social 
sciences under such labels as public choice theory, rational choice or 
rational actor models, deterrence theories, and theories of learning or 
exchange.1 Tyler's work is a serious challenge to the instrumental 
view. Theoretically and empirically, Tyler makes a powerful case that 
what he calls normative considerations are central to the public's deci-
sions about compliance. That is, people follow the law because it is 
the right thing to do. 
The overall normative argument has three key pieces. First, the 
book addresses the question of what motivates compliance with law (p. 
40). Tyler's answer is that two normative factors, the citizen's per-
sonal moral standards and the citizen's sense that the legal demand is 
legitimate, dominate decisions about legal compliance (p. 64). He con-
centrates on legitimacy because it is more readily modifiable by legal 
authorities (p. 65). Second, Tyler turns to the determinants of legiti-
macy (p. 45), including changes in perceived legitimacy that occur in 
reaction to experiences with the police or courts (p. 94). Tyler finds 
that normative rather than instrumental considerations are most im-
portant in shaping the sense that laws or orders ought to be obeyed. 
In particular, a crucial determinant of legitimacy is the justice or injus-
tice of the procedures that authorities follow (p. 102). Third, Tyler 
examines the components of procedural justice itself. 2 Tyler finds that 
the sense that a procedure is fair is primarily derived from noninstru-
mental factors: aspects of fairness that have nothing to do with out-
comes, but instead include such normative concerns as citizens' 
opportunities for self-expression (p. 178). Thus, compliance is traced 
• Professor, Sociology Department, University of Maryland. B.A. 1970, College of William 
& Mary; Ph.D. 1975, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. See, e.g .• J. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE (1975); D. MUELLER, PUB· 
LIC CHOICE (1979). 
2. Chs. 9-11. For an overview of recent research on procedural justice by Tyler and others, 
see E. LIND & T. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988). 
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to such normative considerations as legitimacy; legitimacy, to such 
normative issues as procedural fairness; and procedural fairness, to 
such normative matters as the citizenry having a voice in decisions 
that affect them. 
This conclusion offers considerably more hope - and leeway -
for legal authorities than does a strictly instrumental view of compli-
ance. For example, it indicates that legal authorities can maintain a 
considerable reserve of support through hard times if these authorities 
can convince their constituents that the rules are being drafted and 
administered fairly. And this fairness need not even be a fairness of 
outcomes distributed, but a fairness of procedures followed during the 
distribution. 
These are important issues. Therefore it is essential that we ex-
amine closely the nature and potential limits of the empirical evidence 
Tyler brings to bear. He carried out a panel study that began with a 
random sample of 1575 Chicago residents, interviewed by telephone 
for approximately twenty-five minutes in the spring of 1984 (p. 8). 
One year later, a random subset of 804 respondents was reinterviewed. 
When Tyler examined the effect of actual experiences with the law, the 
analyses included only those 652 respondents in the first wave and 291 
respondents in the second wave who had what Tyler termed "non-
superficial" contacts with the police or courts (pp. 12-13). Non-
superficial contacts were instances of personal contact in which the 
respondent had a stake in the outcome (excluding, therefore, exper-
iences such as being a juror) (p. 9). Overall, the book provides a care-
ful account of the sampling decisions, the composition of the sample, 
and its limitations. 
The data set is unusually rich. Many social scientists have genera-
lized about issues of compliance, legitimacy, and justice from much 
narrower samples, such as undergraduate subjects in laboratory exper-
iments. 3 Few social scientists have taken the trouble to use panel data. 
A panel - two or more sets of data on the same people - is expensive 
to obtain and can be cumbersome to analyze. Panel data, however, are 
invaluable in making clear causal inferences when one's variables can-
not be manipulated, but can be tracked over time. The effect of a per-
son's experience with the police is a prime example of an issue that 
cannot ethically be addressed by experimental methods but lends itself 
well to panel analysis. 
Despite - or because of - the unusually rich data, the legal 
reader may find the data analysis occasionally difficult to digest. Tyler 
uses relatively sophisticated techniques. At the extreme, these involve 
structural equation models of the panel data, complete with correc-
tions for attenuation due to unreliability of measurement, using the 
3. Examples include previous research in procedural justice itself. See E. LIND & T. TYLER, 
supra note 2. 
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popular LISREL data analysis package.4 Any reader who had diffi-
culty with the preceding sentence will find some of the data analysis 
slow going. In some chapters it may be tempting to skip to the discus-
sion, but to do so would miss much of the nuance of the argument, 
which is often developed in the analyses themselves. Tyler generally 
assesses several alternative interpretations and tests his points in sev-
eral ways before drawing conclusions. 
Perhaps the main point that may not be salient to the nonsocial 
scientist in reading about the more complex models Tyler presents is 
that the models are theories, not facts. That is, causal models provide 
a way of accounting for patterns of interrelationships in the data; they 
are not the only way of so accounting. Often a number of alternative 
models might "fit" the data in a statistical sense. The biggest dangers 
- or largest number of alternative models - involve the panel data, 
which are the most complex and are based on the smallest sample 
sizes. In sum, the book's great empirical strength is its panel study; at 
the same time, the panel analyses are the results most in need of care-
ful replication. 
Conceptually, Tyler offers us a heartening vision of the par-
ticipatory democratic state. In a nutshell, if the authorities are "good 
guys," the citizens will be "good citizens," not because they have to 
but because they feel they should (p. 178). I am left, however, with a 
few questions outstanding: Are there limits on this vision of legiti-
macy as underlying compliance and procedural justice as underlying 
legitimacy? And if so, what are they? I think that Tyler is correct as 
regards the importance of normative bases for legal compliance, in 
contrast to the instrumental concerns that have dominated recent dis-
cussions. 5 Nonetheless, this model may prove to be limited- perhaps 
to politically and economically stable modern democracies as Tyler's 
own discussion suggests. 
Tyler notes that other researchers have found that revolutionary 
leaders tend to concentrate their rhetoric on distributive injustices, not 
procedural issues (p. 148). If procedure is so important, why should 
revolutionaries concentrate on distributive questions? Perhaps situa-
tions that inspire revolution are simply situations that are so bad as to 
bring distributive questions to the fore. Tyler's argument that authori-
ties can "buy time" with a citizenry by following legitimate procedures 
may have its limits. When citizens are too short of potatoes, authori-
ties may lose the ability to "buy time" by allowing free speech about 
those potatoes. 
4. LISREL stands for linear structural relationships; it is a computer program for solving 
structural equations. See K. JORESKOG & D. SORBUM, RELATIONSHIPS BY THE METHOD OP 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD, INsrRUMENTAL VARIABLES, AND LEAST SQUARES METHODS (4th 
ed. 1986). 
5. For examples, see supra note 1. 
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Ultimately, this book provides what may be more important than 
answers: new questions. For example, what is the relationship be-
tween social/political change writ small, such as the adjustment that 
may occur in an individual's sense of legitimacy after an encounter 
with legal authorities, and social/political change that is more cata-
clysmic and collective, such as the social movements that bring down 
governments? And what is the linkage of each to a vision, or visions, 
of justice? Tyler's work suggests that normative questions are likely to 
figure prominently at each level. 
